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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
termination of the lease conditional upon the lessor's giving the
proper notice.
It is submitted that in oil and gas law, the use and effect
of the "unless" clause has become so universally recognized that
courts will go far in giving it, where possible, predominance over
all conflicting clauses, as is the case with the granting clause in
the ordinary conveyance.9
PuBLIc PoLIcy - RuhE oF Swift v. Tyson - ATTORNEY'S
FEE PROVISION IN PROMISSORY NOTE. - Residents of West Vir-
ginia executed and delivered notes in Virginia which contained a
provision, valid under the laws of Virginia, for the payment of a
ten per cent. attorney's fee in case of default. In a suit on the
notes in the District Court of the United States for the Southern
District of West Virginia, recovery on this provision was denied
on the ground that the public policy of West Virginia, as declared
by the Supreme Court of Appeals,' forbade the enforcement of
such a provision by the courts. Plaintiff appealed. Held, that
this was a matter of general law, as to which, by the rule of Swift
v. Tyson,2 the federal courts exercise their independent judgment
and apply their own conclusion, and that such provisions are not
contrary to public-policy. Reversed. Citizens National Bank of
Orange, Va. v. Waugh.'
Here West Virginia had no substantial connection with the
contract whereby to invoke her public policy. On the bare facts,
the case would be determined by a United States Supreme Court
decision in which the court enforced a contractual limitation
which was valid in Tennessee, the state where made, but invalid
9 2 T=IFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 1622. Ward v. Ward, 176
Ga. 849, 169 S. E. 120 (1933); Rhodes v. Black, 170 S. C. 193, 170 S. E.
158 (1933) ; Groce v. Southern Ry. Co., 164 S. C. 427, 162 S. E. 425 (1932) ;
Wolverton v. Hoffman, 104 Va. 605, 52 S. E. 176 (1905); Temple's Adm'r
v. Wright, 94 Va. 338, 26 S. E. 844 (1897). But ef. Bartlett v. Petty, 93
W. Va. 608, 117 S. E. 551 (1923); Maddy v. Maddy, 87 W. Va. 581, 105
S. E. 803 (1921).
1 Raleigh County Bank v. Poteet, 74 W. Va. 511, 82 S. E. 332 (1914);
First National Bank of Mlannington v. Bank of Mannington, 76 W. Va. 356,
85 S. B. 541 (1915); First National Bank of Pineville v. Sanders, 77 W. Va.
716, 88 S. E. 187 (1916); Campen Brothers v. Stewart, 106 W. Va. 247, 145
S. E. 381 (1928).
2 41 U. S. (16 Pet.) 1, 4 S. Ct. 128 (1842).
3 78 F. (2d) 325 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
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by statute in Mlississippi, wherein suit was brought.4  There the
court said that Mississippi's connection with the contract was too
remote to warrant invocation of the statute.
The federal courts, however, have previously gone to the full
extent of disregarding the public policy ' of a state as declared by
the state courts in regard to a contract made and to be performed
in that state.' The bringing of the doctrine into West Virginia
for the first time should be worthy of comment.
4 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S.
143, 150, 54 S. Ct. 634 (1934): "Conceding that ordinarily a state may
prohibit performance within its borders even of a contract validly made else-
where, if the performance would violate its laws (Home Tnsurance Company
v. Dick .... page 408 of 281 U. S., 50 S. Ct. 338, 74 L. Ed. 926, 74 A. L.
R. 701), it may not, on grounds of policy, ignore a right which has lawfully
vested elsewhere, if, as here, the interest of the forum has but slight connec-
tion with the substance of the contract obligations. Here performance at
most involved only the casual payment of money in Mississippi." This
language would seem even broad enough to enforce a gaming contract in a
state where void, if valid where made.
5 The question thus presents itself of what is that "public policy" which
the federal courts will determine for themselves. In analyzing this element
in the English common law Lord Haldane, in Rodriguez v. Speyer Bros.
[1919] A. C. 59, 77-81, has made a classification of the influences of public
policy which is summarized as follows: "9 (a) rules which, though originally
based on public policy have become so crystallized that only a statute can
alter them, for example, the rule against perpetuities; (b) cases in which
public policy has never crystallized, in which public policy depends on no real
legal principle,'in which it is accepted as a matter of fact, and in which its
application depends on the circumstances of each particular case, for example,
cases concerning the legality of wagers; (c) cases in which public policy has
partially precipitated itself into legal rules which, however, have remained
subject to its molding influence in the sense of current national policy, as
illustrated by covenants in restraint of trade." Winfield, Public Policy in
the English Common Law (1928) 42 HARv. L. R-v. 76, 96.
Dean Pound enumerates ten public policies which have been declared by
common law courts: "(1) a policy against acts promotive of dishonesty;
(2) a policy against acts tending to oppression; (3) one against acts pro-
motive of crime or violation of law; (4) one against acts destructive of com-
petition; (5) one against acts offending the general morals; (6) one against
acts prejudicially affecting the public service, whether performed by public
officers or by individuals professing a public calling; (7) one against acts
affecting the security of the domestic relations or in restraint of marriage;
(8) one against acts affecting commercial freedom; (9) one against per-
manent or general restrictions on the free use and transfer of property;
and (10) one against general or extensive restrictions upon individual free-
dom of action." A Theory of Social Interests (1920) 15 PUBLICATIONS OF
A.xEIcAN SOCIOLOGICAL SoCmETY 16, 22.
There would seem to be a difference between that "public policy" which
is a rule of law, and that which is a paramount ideal of the law and which,
in event of conflict, will override a mere rule of law. We might say that the
latter is a nascent inanifestation of what later becomes a rule. New legal
problems, presented for the first time, summon into play the contemporary
ideals of the law. Repetition of the problem gradually callouses the "public
policy" into a rule which the courts may thereafter recognize as such; or
2
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West Virginia is in the minority in holding such provisions
for attorney's fees to be against public policy, and perhaps a legis-
lative change should occur.7 If the policy were embodied in a
statute, then the federal courts would be bound to recognize it
within the state at least.' Uniformity of law on the subject is
perhaps even desirable enough to warrant an incorporation into
the uniform statute, but the common law decisions of the federal
courts should not be expected to perform the office of a uniform
statute, as has in effect been suggested by Judge Parker.9
Even though the correctness of the view of our Supreme Court
of Appeals is doubted, "the question of which rule is or is not
sound is not nearly so important as that there shall not be one
rule on this question for the man who must sue in the State Court,
and a different rule for the one who is fortunate enough to be able
to get his cause into the Federal Court."' 01  The fact that West
Virginia has so many border counties makes her problem partic-
ularly acute, since a generalization from the instant case is a very
they may refuse such recognition and nominally say they are applying public
policy, when in truth they are applying a rule of law.
If West Virginia's declaration that provisions for attorney's fees are
against public policy is merely a statement of a rule of law, then the instant
ease goes no further in impinging on states' rights than did Swift v. Tyson.
If, on the other hand, our Supreme Court of Appeals reaches its result by a
determination of public policy, truly as such, then we may conclude that
West Virginia's right to determine her own public policy has been invaded.
But still, Judge Parker might well answer, there is a national public policy
in the true sense which will overbalance the public policy dictated to West
Virginia by her local social and economic equities.
Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U. S.
518, 48 S. Ct. 404 (1927). It is believed that the instant case does not go
as far as the Taxicab case, for in the latter not only was the contract made
in Kentucky, but the suit involved the occupation of real estate, which has
always been regarded as solely within the range of judicial law making of
the local courts.
7 lote (1926) 32 W. VA. L. Q. 147.
828 U. S. C. A. § 725 (1928): "The laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall other-
wise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at
common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply."
Swift v. Tyson, supra n. 2. Our Supreme Court of Appeals cites reasons for
the rule that certainly are sufficient to justify its embodiment in statute;
see cases cited supra n. 1. This device would of course be limited by the doc-
trine of Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., supra
n. 4, (i. e., by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment).
0 Hewlett v. Schadel, 68 F. (2d) 502, 504 (1934). But see as contra at
least in result, Boston & M. R. R. v. Breslin, 80 F. (2d) 749 (1935), where
plaintiff was denied benefit of the federal "turn table doctrine" because the
alleged tort was held to be governed by the 7ez loci, which rejected it.
0l Dawson, Conflict of Decisions Between State and Federal Courts in Ken-
tucky, and the Bemedy (1931) 20 KY. L. J. 16.
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practical invitation to foreign corporations to lend money in West
Virginia.
The question really resolves itself into one of practicality.
From that standpoint, the instant case results in an unwholesome
extension of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson by disputing West Vir-
ginia's public policy with our Supreme Court of Appeals.
TRUSTS - CoRPoRATioN AS BiEFxicwY UNDEm CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUST OF OUTSTANMING CoRPORAE BoNDs. - The Wayne United
Gas Company contracted to sell its entire output to the Owens-
Illinois Glass Company and the Libby-Owens Sheet Glass Com-
pany. Subsequently, the gas company issued first mortgage bonds
secured by its entire property. The only source of revenue of the
gas company was the contract proceeds, which, if paid, would have
been sufficient to meet all of its indebtedness. In 1932, due to
business conditions, the glass companies broke the contract, where-
upon the gas company was forced to default on its obligations.
The glass companies immediately bought up ninety-two per cent.
of the mortgage bonds at depressed prices, and threatened to fore-
close on their security. The petitioners, a minority stockholder,
and an unsecured creditor, now seek the appointment of a receiver
who will take over the assets of the gas company, including any
rights resulting from the breach of contract, and pay off outstand-
ing claims, the .glass companies being limited in their claim to the
amount actually paid for the bonds, on the theory that a con-
structive trust devolved upon them as to the bonds. Held, that
no fraud having been alleged, and no fiduciary relationship having
been shown, there are no grounds for a constructive trust.- Bell
v. Wayne United Gas Company.2
A conAtructive trust is a remedial device by which courts of
equity restore property to the true owner, where legal ownership
has bJen obtained by the constructive trustee in some unconscion-
able fashion.3 The petitioners in the present case can show no
1 Maxwell, J., dissented on the ground that the facts disclosed a fiduciary
relationship. Woods, J., concurred.
2 181 S. E. 609 (W. Va. 1935).
3 Catleton Mining & Power Co. v. West Virginia Northern By. Co., 113 W.
Va. 20, 166 S. E. 536 (1932); loyd v. Duffy, 68 W. Va. 339, 69 S. E. 993,
33 L. R. A. (N.S.) 883 (1910); Davis v. Settle, 43 W. Va. 17, 26 S. E. 557
(1896); 1 Peany, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 19 9) § 166; 3 Po.MEROY,
EqUITY JURSPRUDENcE (4th ed. 1918) §§ 1044, 1053.
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